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Leonel Cesarino Pessôa, São Paulo / Brazil 
 
Inequality,  Ability  to  Pay  and  The  Theories  of  Equal  and  Proportional 
Sacrifices 
 
Abstract: Brazil has one of the worst distributions of income in the world. The wealth of the richest 
1% of the population is equal to that of the poorest 50%. Brazil has a greater concentration of wealth 
than ninety-five percent of the countries on which data is available. In the legal field, tax justice is 
based on the constitutional principle of the “ability to pay”, according to which taxes should be paid 
based on the economic capacity of the taxpayer. This principle first appeared in the Brazilian legal 
order in the 1946 Constitution, was excluded from the texts of 1967/69, and reappeared in § 1 of 
article 145 of the 1988 Constitution.  
The aim of this paper is to examine two possible grounds for the ability to pay principle (equal 
sacrifices and proportional sacrifices) to show how, in Brazil, the interpretations that seek to assign a 
positive content to the principle are limited to the horizons of a particular form of State associated 
with the theory of equal sacrifice. This theory for its turn is consistent with a theory of justice, under 
which no expense or charge levied by the government can alter the distribution of welfare produced by 
the market. As the application of the ability to pay principle is done within the limits of that horizon, 
as a consequence, this principle does not play an important role in the issue of reduction of inequality 
in Brazil. 
Keywords: ability to pay – tax justice - equal sacrifices – proportional sacrifices –– inequality – 
distribution of income - theory of justice – Brazilian Federal Supreme Court  
 
I. Introduction 
Brazil is a country marked by social inequality. Although it has decreased recently, income 
inequality in Brazil remains one of the largest in the world. In the book edited by Ricardo 
Paes  de  Barros,  Miguel  Foguel  and  Gabriel  Ulyssea  on  the  recent  reduction  in  income 
inequality, are presented data showing how bad is the current situation: “the income earned by 
the richest 1% of the population is equal to income earned by the poorest 50%” what makes 
that “95% of the countries for which data is available, present lower concentrations than 
Brazil”. 
1 
2 
                                                           
1 R. Barros, R. e M. Carvalho, Nota Técnica, In: Desigualdade de Renda no Brasil: Uma análise da queda 
recente vol. 1, (ed. by R. Barros; M. Foguel; G. Ulyssea), 2006, 22. 
2 In the book mentioned, it is shown that there is a long tradition of research on inequality in Brazil dating back 
to the 1970s. They write: "Shortly after the publication of data from Census 1970, two studies showed the large 
increase in inequality of income distribution in Brazil between 1960 and 1970: A. Fishlow, ‘Brazilian size 
distribution of income’. In: American Economic Review, v. 62, n. 2, 1972 e R. HOFFMANN; J.C. DUARTE, ‘A 
distribuição da renda no Brasil’, In: Revista de Administração de Empresas, v. 12, n. 2, p.46-66, 1972”. 2 
While research on economic inequality date from some time, the discussion about how to 
face it, in terms of tax policies, is not an issue in Brazil. Tax Justice is not a recurring theme 
in the research taking place in the country. Very little has been written about it and this has 
never  been  a  topic  in  the  public  sphere  debates.  In  this  sphere,  when  the  tax  system  is 
discussed, it is usually discussed in terms of its efficiency. The proposal to impose a tax on 
the financial transactions, for example, has this sense. This is also, in general, the goal of the 
various tax reform proposals under discussion in Congress. 
Recently, this situation has changed a bit. In the first presidential campaign, President 
Lula has touched the issue of tax justice, when he said that the personal income tax, in Brazil, 
should be more progressive, so that the rich would pay more tax than they currently do. A 
Study of the IPEA
3, from 2008, pointed in the same direction: from a comparison with other 
countries, the study has shown that, in Brazil, the income tax is less progressive than in the 
majority of these countries. In Lula’s government it was enacted a norm 
4 that established two 
new rates for the personal income tax, making it a little more progressive. 
In the law field, the issue of tax justice is almost immediately linked to the constitutional 
principle  of  the  ability  to  pay.  This  principle  entered  the  Brazilian  legal  order  with  the 
Constitution of 1946, was excluded from the texts of 1967/69 and was once again included in 
the  Constitution  of  1988.  The  first  paragraph  of  article  145  of  this  Constitution  states: 
“Always when possible, taxes will have a personal character and will be graduated according 
to the economic capacity of the taxpayer (...)”.
5 Both with respect to law making and to its 
application, discussions on tax justice depart from that concept. 
Under the Legislative, this has occurred, for example, both when the Lula administration 
increased the number of income tax rates, such as when the government Erundina 
6 sent to the 
parliament the proposal to increase taxation on property, in order to make public transport 
free. Measures were justified by saying that the framework should be changed for taxation to 
be in accordance with the ability to pay. Moreover, one of the strongest arguments against the 
introduction of  a  single  tax  on  financial transactions  -  proposal  that is  in the Brazilian 
                                                           
3 The acronym IPEA means: Institute of Applied Economic Research. It is the main institution for research in 
this area in Brazil. 
4 It was a Medida Provisória. It is a norm that is enacted by the executive power, but has to be approved by 
parliament. 
5 Victor Uckmar shows a series of recent constitutions that predict that taxes should be paid based on "the 
economic possibilities" of taxpayers: Argentina (1946, art. 28), Bolivia (1967, art. 8 d), Bulgaria (1947, art. 94), 
Ecuador (1966/67, art. 94), Greece (1951, art. Art. 3); Mexico (1917, art. 31), Switzerland (1981, art. 41), Chile 
(1925, art. 10), Jordan (1952, art. 111), Italy (1947, art. 53), Syria (1950, art . 25), Spain (1977, art. 31.1), 
Venezuela (1947, art. 282). Cf. V. Uckmar, Princípios comuns de direito constitucional tributário, 2ª edição, 
1999. 
6 She was the major of the city of São Paulo between 1989 – 1992. 3 
Parliament - is that financial transaction are not a basis that reports adequately the different 
manifestations of the ability to pay. 
Also in the Judiciary discussion about justice in taxation is made based on the concept of 
the ability to pay. Some jurists think that the practical application of this principle would 
result in greater tax justice. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the interpretation that the legal literature and the 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court gave to the constitutional principle of the ability to pay. But 
this analysis will be quite specific: its purpose is to put in evidence two possible grounds for 
the principle (equal sacrifices and proportional sacrifices) and the social models or views that 
correspond  to  each  of  them.  This  will  be  done  in  order  to  show  how,  in  Brazil,  the 
interpretations that seek to assign a positive content to it are limited to the horizons of a 
particular form of State associated with the theory of equal sacrifice. 
The paper is divided in seven sections including this introduction. The second section 
presents the interpretations of the principle in the legal literature, the third section examines 
how it was interpreted by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court,  the fourth discusses two 
possible  grounds  for  the  principle,  the  fifth  explores  the  consequences  of  these  different 
grounds, the sixth section presents some final considerations. 
 
II. The interpretations of the ability to pay principle in the legal literature  
After the publication of the 1946 Constitution, the ability to pay principle was the object of 
discussion and divergence amongst jurists, principally in relation to its application. 
7 In the 
first edition of his book, Teoria Geral do Direito Tributário, Becker shows how two currents 
were in opposition in this point. 
8 
Even if some would defend that the ability to pay principle should produce effects 
immediately, the position that it should be considered as a rule that merely states policies
9 
prevailed. This rule would serve, according to Sousa, to guide the lawmakers "in the choice of 
facts,  acts or transactions  that  should  be subject  to  taxation,  and in the grading   of  this 
measure". 
10  Over  the  years,  this  initial  interpretation  began  to  change  and  the  other, 
according to which the rule would take effect immediately, became the majority. 
Historically, the interpretation  of the effects to be produced by the principle has gone 
through two distinct phases. This was true also in Italy, whose literature greatly influenced the 
                                                           
7 In Brazil, it is used a concept of “technical efficaciousness”. I am not sure which term should be used in 
English 
8 Alfredo Augusto Becker. Teoria Geral do Direito Tributário, 1963, 441.  
9 A kind of norm that states a program. 
10 Rubens Gomes de Sousa, Compêndio de Legislação Tributária, 1975, 95. 4 
Brazilian tax law. According to a first interpretation, a precise content was assigned to the 
principle: economic force. Only where economic force could be found could there be as well 
ability to pay and, consequently taxation. One of the practical consequences of this was the 
recognition of some situations, such as the zone of vital minimum which could not be taxed 
because the people in this zone do not have ability to pay. 
Later, it was interpreted that the ability to pay principle would be virtually linked to other 
constitutional norms as the one which consecrates the duty of solidarity. In this sense, it 
would have a fundamental role in the protection of the interest of the state: having in view, the 
ideal of solidarity, the aspect to be singled out in the principle turns to be that no one should 
shirk to contribute to public expenses in conformance with his ability to pay. 
In this way, two distinct interests are protected by the ability to pay principle: in the first 
place, the interest of the taxpayer, in the sense that no one should be taxed beyond his ability 
to pay. Besides that, the interest of the state, for all manifestations of ability to pay cannot 
escape taxation. 
11 
 
III. The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court 
These two interests also appear in the interpretation that the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, 
the highest body of the Brazilian Judiciary, gave to the norm.  In a research conducted on the 
web site of the Federal Supreme Court, 
12 it was verified that from the promulgation of the 
1988 Constitution, in October 2008, until November 2008, the ability to pay principle was 
applied 70 times at the decisions. After being excluded the judgments in which the use of the 
principle was merely apparent, they were divided according to the interests that were being 
protected - State or taxpayer. 
In a few decisions, some dissenting opinions applied the ability to pay principle  to 
protect the interest of the taxpayer. Examples of these are the following: in one of them, it 
was argued that financial transactions could not be chosen as the base for the CPMF 
13 for not 
expressing any manifestation of ability to pay. In another case, according to other dissenting 
opinion, the introduction of a tax regime called in Brazil substituição tributária - in which the 
tax of the entire production chain is paid at the beginning - would result in the violation of the 
ability to pay principle. 
                                                           
11 This theme was developed in: L.C. Pessôa, Interesse fiscal, interesse do contribuinte e o princípio da 
capacidade contributiva, In: Direito Tributário Atual, nº 18 (2004), 123-136. 
12 The results of the research were presented at the Law and Society Annual Meeting, in Denver (CO) in may 
2009 and were published later in Revista Direito GV, 5 (2009), 95-106.  
13 A Brazilian tax on financial transactions. 5 
In several cases, however, the ability to pay principle was applied to protect the interest 
of the state. Examples of applications of the principle to protect the interest of the State are 
the following: in the terms of article 145, first paragraph of the Constitution of 1988, literally, 
the ability to pay principle applies in only one of the five types of tribute that being, the taxes 
[impostos, in Brazil]: “Always when possible, the taxes (...)” (art. 145, § 1º). But there are 
several  decisions  of the Federal  Supreme Court which sought  to  apply the ability to  pay 
principle to another type of tribute: fees [taxas, in Brazil]. Even the fact that the constitution 
literally  determines  that  the  principle  is  only  applicable  to  taxes  [impostos],  the  federal 
Supreme Court understood that nothing impedes that it should be applied to fees [taxas] as 
well. 
There are also several court cases in which the ability to pay principle was applied in a 
similar way. They are cases in which a differential treatment was given to some situations that 
presented themselves as distinct. The taxpayer always rebelled against the distinction, arguing 
principally violation of the principle of equality. The ability to pay principle was used in all 
judgments, so as to ensure differential treatment to different situations. An example is the 
following. It was argued that Article 9 of law 9.317/96, by impeding the corporations that 
provide services to opt for a special tax regime for small business called simples, would be 
establishing unequal treatment for taxpayers and then violating the principle of equality. The 
Supreme Court decided that there is no violation of the principle of equality if the law, for 
non-tax reasons, gives unequal treatment to micro and small businesses that have different 
ability to pay. Therefore, the principle of ability to pay was being used to protect the interest 
of the state and justify differential treatment. 
The analysis of the decisions led to a principal conclusion: in Brazil, the ability to pay 
principle was utilized by the Justices of the Federal Supreme Court, in some few dissenting 
opinions, to protect the interests of the taxpayer and several times to protect the interests of 
the state. Be it to assure differentiated taxes in some situations, as in the case of companies 
who opted for the special tax regime, be it to guarantee that fees, [taxas, in Brazil] can be 
collected at differentiated rates, be it, in general, to assure taxation in situations in which the 
manifestation of the ability to pay exists, the ability to pay principle was always used in a way 
that in situations in which the ability is revealed the tax should be collected. 
This analysis could make people believe in the thesis that the application of the ability to 
pay principle would signify greater distributive justice. After all, if it is the State's interest, not 
the taxpayer, which predominates widely in the interpretation of the Court, wouldn’t this lead 
to  more  distributive  justice?  However,  a  careful  reading  of  the  situations  in  which  the 6 
principle was used does not indicate that its application has resulted in large gains in terms of 
distributive justice. Even if it was to defend the interest of the state, the principle has been 
used  only  in  a  few  specific  situations  of  the  business  life  and  fundamentally  to  ensure 
differentiated treatment to companies of different sizes. But could it be different? To answer 
this question, this paper is intended to go back to its foundations and present tow possible 
senses for the ability to pay principle. 
 
IV. Equal and proportional sacrifices 
For what reason should taxation be a function of the ability to pay of each one? Historically, 
not always the principle of ability to pay was dominant. At least one criteria ran with it 
throughout history: the benefit principle. According to the latter, there would be justice in 
taxation if the amount to be paid in terms of tax correspond to the benefit of each one for the 
existence of the state. But why the principle of the ability to pay would be better than the 
benefit principle in terms of justice? What are the fundamentals of the ability to pay principle 
that mark its superiority?  
The principle of ability to pay seems to be founded on a simple idea: those who have 
more money, have more capacity to contribute. Murphy and Nagel show, however, that this 
apparent simplicity hides major theoretical difficulties, since one can say that the rich have 
more ability to pay the poor in at least two different senses. 
14 In this regard, they write: 
 
“First we might think that people with more money can afford to give away more in the sense 
that additional money is worth less to them in real terms, so they can pay more money than a 
poorer person – sometimes much more – with no greater loss in welfare. Alternatively, we might 
think that people with more money can afford to give away more because even if they sustain a 
larger real sacrifice they will be left with more: they will still have, in some sense, enough – and 
will still be better off than those who started out with less”. 
15 
 
These two senses in which one can say that people have different ability to pay will give rise 
to two theories that try to substantiate the principle differently. On the one hand, according to 
the theory of equal sacrifices, the principle of the ability to pay determines that the richer 
                                                           
14 According to Murphy and Nagel, there is also a third interpretation of the of ability to pay principle presented 
by them, according to which the ability to pay would be related not to the person's current wealth, but to its 
potential wealth, to the decisions that could have been taken by the person and to the income that the person 
could have obtained by virtue of those decisions. This interpretation leads to the theory of taxation according to 
endowment: people should pay based not on the income that they actually hold, but “according to their 
endowment, which is defined as their ability to earn income and accumulate wealth”. (L. Murphy, T. Nagel, The 
Myth of Ownership, 20) “The origin of the endowment principle lies”, according to Murphy and Nagel, “in the 
earliest versions of the ability to pay approach”. (op. cit., 21) The professor of the New York University School 
of Law, David Bradford, recently died, is one of its most eminent defenders.  
15 L. Murphy, L.; T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 2002 p. 24. 7 
contribute more than the poorer ones, because the amount of taxes to be collected should be 
different in nominal terms, so that the sacrifice is equal in real terms. 
This theory assumes, therefore, that the marginal value of money is decreasing. This 
means that the money that one person has more than the other does not have its nominal and 
real value raised the same way. While the nominal value increases to a certain extent, the real 
value of money increases less than that. In other words, under this theory, the rich should pay 
more than the poor ones, because with this payment they will not suffer a greater loss in their 
welfare, because to them, money does not have the real value it has for the poorest. 
On the other hand, according to the theory of proportional sacrifices, both “A” and “B” 
must collect taxes in a different amount, because, it will rest much more money for those that 
have more, even if they make a real greater sacrifice. The consequence is that, besides having 
enough, they will continue to be richer than those with less and it is this difference that 
justifies, for this theory, that they should contribute with more. 
The difference between the theories of equal and proportional sacrifices were presented 
at a given level of abstraction. It is important now to point out this difference more concretely 
discussing, from the standpoint of the state organization, the consequences of the application 
of both theories. 
  
V. The differences between the theories 
According to the so-called liberal paradigm, the state should be minimal. It should perform 
minimal functions, such as ensuring the existence of the police and the judiciary to resolve 
any conflicts. All that it could not do is to intervene in relations between the parties, which 
should be absolutely free to interact in the market. 
As Habermas points out, on the basis of these ideas there is a very particular conception 
of justice: as the law ensures formal equality to the actors who interact in the market, it is 
enough to define the individual spheres of freedom of each one, i.e. ensure that the state does 
not intervene in private spheres, for the relations between them to shape and develop in a fair 
manner. 
Thus,  justice  in  the  relations  between  citizens  is  assured,  according  to  the  liberal 
paradigm, by the minimal state intervention in these relations. Whitin the grounds of taxation, 
the theory  of equal  sacrifice  conceives  the state  just like that. According to  Murphy and 
Nagel, the idea of equal sacrifices “does make sense if embedded in a wider theory of justice 8 
that  rejects  all  government  expenditure  or  taxation  to  alter  the  distribution  of  welfare 
produced by the market”. 
16  
For the state not to intervene in the relations between the parties, the tax system could not 
play any role that would undermine the free market interaction. The more neutral it is, the 
better it would perform its function of not intervening in the decisions of economic agents. It 
is precisely not to intervene in the pre-tax relationships that exist between economic agents, 
that the state should require from each of them, in terms of tax, the same sacrifice. Murphy 
and Nagel accordingly conclude: 
 
“Such a libertarian theory of justice, typically based on either some notion of desert for the 
rewards of one’s labor, or of strict moral entitlement to pretax market outcomes, limits the role of 
the  state  to  the  protection  of  those  entitlements  and  other  rights,  along,  perhaps,  with  the 
provision of some uncontroversial public goods. If (and only if) that is the theory of distributive 
justice we accept, the principle of equal sacrifice does make sense”. 
17 
 
Therefore, the theory of equal sacrifices makes sense within a particular theory of the state, 
according to which its role is limited to ensure certain private rights and provide some public 
uncontroversial goods. 
However, the ability to pay principle can be also founded on the idea of proportional 
sacrifices. This theory for its turn is compatible with the claim that the state perform broader 
functions to correct the inequality of income distribution. Require, for example, from the 
richer, to pay more taxes than the poorer not only to correct market failures, but to correct the 
inequity of the current state of affairs is also to impose that both contribute according to their 
ability to pay.  But in this case, not ability to pay as equal sacrifices, but as proportional 
sacrifices. 
  
VI. Final Considerations 
At the beginning of the work were presented data on the inequality in income distribution in 
Brazil and it was seen that, in the law field, the discussion about tax justice departs from the 
concept ability to pay that reentered in Brazilian legal system with the Constitution 1988. 
It  was  presented  the  interpretation  originally  given  to  this  constitutional  disposition. 
From  the  works  of  Rubens  Gomes  de  Sousa,  it  was  seen  that  this  principle  would  be 
interpreted as a merely programmatic norm. Over the years, the legal literature both in Italy 
and  Brazil,  as  the  Brazilian  Federal  Supreme  Court  gave  the  ability  to  pay  principle  an 
effective role in protecting both the interest of the taxpayer and the state. 
                                                           
16 L. Murphy; T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 2002, 26. 
17 L. Murphy, T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 2002, 26. 9 
It was seen then that the idea that everyone pays taxes according to their ability to pay is 
compatible  with  two  different  grounds:  equal  and  proportional  sacrifices.  Thus,  the  same 
principle may give rise to different interpretations as distinct social models or visions are at its 
foundation. 
According to the theory of equal sacrifices, the richer should pay more taxes than the 
poorer so that the ultimate sacrifice is the same. According to the theory of proportional 
sacrifices, the richer should pay more because even if they pay, they will still be better off 
than the poorer and this form of taxation reduces the injustice of the current situation of 
inequality. 
Internationally, the theory of equal sacrifices has always prevailed as the foundation for 
the principle. Writing about vertical equity that is a term that, in the economic literature, 
corresponds to the principle, Musgrave wrote: “vertical equity, since Stuart Mill, has been 
viewed in terms of an equal-sacrifice prescription. Taxpayers are said to be treated equally if 
their tax payments involve an equal sacrifice or lost of welfare”. 
18 
In Brazil, the ability to pay principle is always invoked when the issue is the reduction of 
inequality  and  the  role  the  tax  system  can  play  in  this  regard.  Within  the  judiciary,  the 
principle appeared in 70 decisions of the Supreme Court. 
The analysis of these decisions showed that, even though the principle was almost always 
applied in the defense of the interest of the state, it has been used only in a few specific 
situations  of  the  business  life  and  to  ensure,  fundamentally  differentiated  treatment  to 
companies of different sizes. 
From a normative point of view, the issue in those decisions is the possibility to provide 
more favorable conditions to a particular group of companies. Large and small companies 
should pay taxes differently, since they have different ability to pay, in order for the sacrifices 
to be the same. This use of the principle, therefore, is compatible with the Liberal State in 
which the idea of taxation based on the theory of equal sacrifice is grounded. 
In these decisions, in was never called into question the so-called pre-tax distribution 
established by the market: the application of the principle not even remotely threatened to 
problematize it. 
 
   
                                                           
18 Richard Musgrave; Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practise, 1989, 228. 10 
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